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To be properly justice, global justice must be a kind of justice.  How is 
this kind defined?  Around a negative definition, little dispute seems
admissible.  Philosophers assume that global justice must be contrasted
with domestic or national justice.  Just as domestic justice is a virtue of a 
national society, global justice is a virtue of the global society.  On this 
view, global is just a qualifier that does not alter the substance of justice. 
But what is the substance that remains identical across the national— 
global divide?  On the positive question of what global justice is or could 
possibly be, various competing conceptions are available, and largely the
contestability of global justice depends on the contestability of justice in 
general. Still there might be a common core to all those conceptions. 
The classic definition of justice might give us a clue.  According to Ulpian,
“[j]ustice is a steady and enduring will to render unto everyone his right.”1 
This definition characterizes justice in terms of a natural virtue, so to speak.
It is a kind of will, or a quality of the soul.  For contemporary political 
philosophers, justice is a moral quality of a political society, rather than a 
trait of character, and I will follow this modern usage.  In any event, I am
more interested in the normative content of Ulpian’s definition: “to render to 
each his due,” that is, “to give to everyone his own.”2  This part of the definition 
might seem circular, because, as is obvious, we cannot establish what is
everyone’s due or own without a just social system that demarcates the rights
of different individuals. Yet it is not empty, because it stresses that justice
characterizes some system of property rights, where “property” is broadly
understood as a regime of liberties, claim rights, powers, or immunities to use, 
consume, enjoy, and control various external goods (typically, external
resources).  Justice-related rights do not exhaust the universe of moral 
rights and other practical reasons.  For instance, people have moral rights 
to be treated as free and equal persons in all social endeavors, not to be
physically harmed or socially humiliated, and to enter and leave all kinds of 
associative pursuits.  I assume that these rights are prior to social conventions 
and different from property rights (over external resources). Of course, a 
system of property rights does not mean a system of private property. 
People have different rights in various regimes of property and justice
is defined accordingly.  Private property is one among various alternative
arrangements that regulate the control of external resources.
Whereas fundamental moral rights are conceptually prior to social
practices, any system of property rights (e.g., over external resources) is a 
deliberate or unintended outcome of human action.  There is nothing like 
1. DIG. 1.1.10 (Ulpian, Rules 1) (Alan Watson ed., 1985). 
2. Id. 
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a natural system of justice, if by natural we mean a non-societal. On this
point, legal positivists since Hobbes and Hume agree.  They disagree, 
however, on what kind of human action is required for a system of property 
rights to emerge and function.  Statists hold that there is no property in a 
pre-political state, which means that government is a conceptual prerequisite 
for ownership and that, therefore, property rights in the state of nature are 
meaningless.  Hobbes, who embraced this position, thought that in the
state of nature we have one single liberty, namely, the liberty to defend
ourselves and preserve our life. The vocabulary of property and justice 
only pops up in the favorable scenario of a commonwealth that assures the
protection of life. Today there is abundant empirical literature that belies
Hobbes’s extreme position.  In various stateless situations, there is evidence
of systems of property that are stable and generally respected.3  Hume first
adumbrated this stateless, conventional theory of justice.  He claimed that 
the rules of justice are social inventions.  But what kind of inventions? 
Inventions often are deliberately designed artifacts to serve various purposes. 
Hume says that it is a serious mistake to think that the rules of justice have
been invented in the same way.  He maintains that the institution of justice is 
a spontaneous and unintended result of people’s self-interested actions.  So
property rights are not created by the State; they originally derive from 
social conventions that can be called “laws of nature” only “if by natural, 
we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to 
mean what is inseparable from the species.”4  For Hume, laws of nature
are artificial but not arbitrary, for they are indispensable for organizing
peaceful and productive social coexistence in the human species. Therefore,
he takes the existence of property rights to be conceptually independent 
from government. 
Though Hume fixes on individualistic possession, his approach can be 
applied to the emergence of various regimes of property rights that 
communalize land and other resources to larger or lesser extent for different
 3. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (discussing the
system of private governance that has developed in the diamond trade); Avner Grief, 
Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’
Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 526 (1993) (discussing the reputation mechanism 
employed by Mediterranean traders that promoted merchant trading abroad). 
4. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 311 (David Fate Norton & Mary
J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1740). 
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uses.5  To allow for the variability of spontaneous social regimes, we 
might correct Hume’s naturalistic understanding of the laws of nature and
assert that the “laws of nature” are natural in the sense that they comprehend
those conventions that are indispensable for human beings at a certain 
point of their socioeconomic evolution given their particular genotypic 
and phenotypic features and prevailing ecological conditions—relative 
vulnerability, limited altruism, scarcity of consumption goods, abundance 
of land, et cetera.6  Such features require social cooperation in the guise 
of labor division, specialization, and long-term organization of productive 
endeavors, et cetera.
Here I will differentiate two conceptions of justice.  Hume illustrates 
what I call the “transactional conception.” On this conception, justice is 
the compliance with the set of property rights that arise out of various forms 
of mutually advantageous exchange.  Once these transactional justice rules 
are established by social rules, they have normative force for agents acting
in the relevant practical setting. In developed communities, governmental 
authorities define property rights with greater precision and provide a 
more or less effective regime for their enforcement.  Roman law is an
example of how customary rules in agricultural communities tend to be 
codified as the density of population and the productivity of land make
the administration of a formalized and centralized system of justice
economically efficient.  Codification of the rules of justice already slides 
from the transactional conception of justice into the associational conception, 
for it normally involves the conversion of some possessory entitlements 
into rights in rem, whose normative force is not circumscribed to parties 
to a transaction but extends to all members of the political association.
Actually, the creation of rights in rem presupposes the prior creation of a 
political community.  Even if traditionally considered as institutions of 
private law, erga omnes rights are institutions of public law, because they
are conceptually linked to the existence of a commonwealth.  Because 
both participants and nonparticipants to various interpersonal cooperative 
transactions are obliged by rights in rem, it is not participation in such 
transactions but rather membership in the commonwealth that makes a 
subject obliged to respect those rights that are publicly ascertained.
For the “associational conception,” justice derives from property rights 
that are established within a certain kind of association. Associational 
justice must be consistent with the fundamental moral rights of members 


















6. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968), for a 
discussion of the system-sensitivity of moral rules. 
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and nonmembers and with the rules of justice originated in transactional 
justice. We have the problem of fair division of burdens and benefits 
whenever a number of individuals decide to establish an association for 
common or shared purposes and the furtherance of these purposes requires 
a certain degree of collectivization of losses and/or benefits. The most
important example of associational justice is the so-called “social justice,” 
which derives from the property rights established in a political community. 
Political associations raise special questions of justice.  Some authors 
contend that those special questions derive from characteristic features of 
the modern state.  For instance, Thomas Nagel argues that two defining 
features of the political community justify associative redistributive duties
that hold among its members but not among members and nonmembers. 
Those features are the fact that the political community exercises sovereign
power over its members by resorting to the imposition of coercive rules 
and the fact that it exercises that power in the name of its members.7 In 
this paper, I will not challenge this assertion but will nonetheless argue 
that two other features strongly bear on the special questions of justice 
raised by political associations.  Those features, though contingent, are 
also commonly true of political associations: (a) their contestability, and 
(b) their power of self-transformation (which is a feature of sovereignty).
I will argue that the fact that international associations lack sovereign 
power makes the problem of global justice dissimilar from the problem of
domestic social justice.  In fact, the principle of self-determination of national 
States is applicable to national States, but inapplicable to international
associations.  International associations can only be transformed by the 
sovereign decision of their State members. Therefore, whereas social justice
theorizing can support constitutional interpretation and potential self-
transformation of the political community, global justice theorizing can
support neither treaty interpretation nor self-transformation of international 
associations. A corollary of the discussion is that global justice denotes a 
highly idealized political program for the future organization of a global
redistributive association.  Free and voluntary membership in such association 
would be jeopardized by the fact that it could not guarantee substantial 
exit rights, thus rendering the program dystopian rather than utopian.
In pursuing my argument, I will have to address a myriad of issues.  In 
Section II, I discuss an example of the transactional conception of justice. 
7. See Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113,
128 (2005). 
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My example is Hume’s account of the conventions of justice.  It is a good 
example, I think, because Hume contends that such conventions do not
presuppose the prior establishment of a political association.  In Section
III, I discuss the associational conception of justice.  I argue that this
conception always refers to distributional concerns within a particular kind 
of association, and I show that associational distributional criteria normally 
depend on the character of the relevant association.  I also explain the
problem of political or national justice in terms of the associational conception 
of justice. In Section IV, I enumerate some varieties of national political
associations and briefly review the different distributional concerns generated 
by each variety.  Section V is devoted to explaining why national political
associations are contestable. Contestability, in such associations, derives 
from a twofold form of constitutional indeterminacy.  In Section VI, I point 
out that international customs generally establish forms of transactional
justice but not a regime of global redistribution.  In Section VII, I discuss 
four types of international associations, and I contend that none of these 
associations can be construed as providing for global redistribution.  In 
Section VIII, I assert that international associations do not offer the same 
leeway for constitutional interpretation that is present in most national
political communities.  The orthodox form of legal interpretation that
international associations impose, together with their lack of sovereignty,
constrain the self-transformative abilities of such associations.  A natural 
outcome of these characteristics of international associations, which I
discuss in Section IX, is that the practical import of global justice arguments 
is much more limited than that of domestic justice arguments.  Because 
there is no way to argue that existing international organizations establish 
the essentials of a redistributive association, associational justice can
justify no redistributive measure to which national States do not explicitly
commit themselves by their spontaneous and sovereign decisions. In
addition, because transactional justice is irrelevant for warranting those 
measures, global justice is a misnomer save as a label for designating a 
program for a global redistributive association. This new kind of association 
is not required by justice, and may even be hard to reconcile—conceptually
and in practice—with basic civil liberties. 
II. THE TRANSACTIONAL CONCEPTION
The primary example of a transactional conception of justice is Hume’s.
Hume follows the classic conception of justice and says that the fundamental 
conventions are the stability of possessions, their transfer by consent, and 
the obligation to fulfill promises.8  He claims that these conventions have 
8. HUME, supra note 4, at 339. 
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arisen as a byproduct of patterns of cooperative transactions originally 
motivated by self-interest: “[t]his system [of justice], therefore, 
comprehending the interest of each individual, is of course advantageous 
to the public; though it be not intended for that purpose by the inventors.”9 
How does Hume conceive of the pre-political evolution of the institutions
of justice? The key to understanding Hume’s thought is that he viewed
society as a mutually advantageous invention.  The infirmities of humankind 
foredoom the human species to tragedy without an invention that makes 
up for humankind’s infirmities: 
Of all the animals, with which this globe is peopl’d, there is none towards whom
nature seems, at first sight, to have exercis’d more cruelty than towards man, in 
the numberless wants and necessities, with which she has loaded him, and in the 
slender means, which she affords to the relieving these necessities.10 
He goes on to say, “society provides a remedy”11 in a threefold way: “[b]y 
the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented. By the partition of 
employments, our ability increases.  And by mutual succor we are less
exposed to fortune and accidents.”12 
Now the main challenge to the maintenance of society, which originally 
grows from the “natural appetites betwixt the sexes” and the new affection 
to company and conversation cultivated by early society, is the avidity of
acquiring goods and possessions for our nearest friends and ourselves,
which is “insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society.”13 
This destructive sentiment would prevent people from the peaceful
“enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir’d by our industry and 
good fortune”14 if all the members of society did not enter a convention 
“to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods.”15  Hume
asserts that “the convention for the distinction of property, and for the 
stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the
establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing 
and observing of this rule, there remains little or nothing to be done
towards settling a perfect harmony and concord.”16
 9. Id. at 339. 
10. Id. at 311. 
11. Id. at 312. 
12. Id.
 13. Id. at 316. 
14. Id. at 313. 
15. Id. at 314. 
16. Id. at 315–16. 
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Hume rejects the idea that the origin of justice rests on a social contract.
The conventions founding justice are ultimately caused by “a general 
sense of common interest.”17  Thus, two individuals’ reciprocal regard for
their possessions and the ensuing interpersonal protection of their possessory
entitlements derive from a sort of transaction: 
I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of
his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me.  He is
sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct.  When this common
sense of interest is mutually express’d, and is known to both, it produces a suitable 
resolution and behavior. And this may properly enough be called a convention or
agreement betwixt us . . . .18 
In this transaction, the two individuals exchange a sort of negative 
service, namely, the abstention from disturbing each other’s possessions. 
Yet the exchange is not made explicit in a contract or agreement.  Similar
analyses can be applied to promises mutually exchanged by two individuals 
and to exchanges of goods, where the parties to the transaction mutually
respect their new possessions after the transference.  All these are cases 
of transactional justice, because justice is defined as the quality of a certain 
transaction, for example, the fulfillment of the terms of the transaction. 
When these transactions multiply in a community, individuals realize that 
their regular observance contributes to the public interest, and so the rules 
of justice are progressively generalized as institutions that apply to all
actual and potential transactions within the group. Justice as a kind of
customary law has then emerged.
Hume gives two well-known examples to illustrate the possible emergence 
of the conventions of justice without an explicit contract or agreement. 
The first example is the spontaneous cooperation between two men in a
boat: 
Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho’
they have never given promises to each other.  Nor is the rule governing the stability
of possession the less derived from human conventions, that it arises gradually,
and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the
inconveniences of transgressing it.19 
The second example concerns the joint draining of a meadow: 
Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common;
because ‘tis easy for them to know each other’s mind; and each must perceive,
that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the 
whole project.20 
17. Id. at 314–15. 
18. Id. at 315. 
19. Id.
 20. Id. at 345. 
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The standard way of modeling the two examples is by means of a matrix 
that represents a perfect convergence of interests (figure 1).  Both agents 
have a single individually and collectively advantageous strategy. Though 
these examples might be called “conventions” or “agreements,” they are 
hardly conventions or agreements in a proper sense, because both agents 
will predictably pursue their weakly dominant strategy. To be sure, because 
the game has two equilibria, the question of equilibrium selection can be 
formally raised.  But coordination seems all too natural in this situation 
because individual failing guarantees the minimal payoff 0, while choosing 
Row/Drain offers a chance of one unit with no risk of loss.  Therefore, 
there is no coordination problem in these examples.21  Although a modicum
of understanding is certainly necessary to prevent defection, norms or 
conventions of coordination seem unnecessary.22 




Row/Drain  1 ʜ  1 0 ʜ  0 
Defect 0 ʜ  0 0 ʜ  0 
A preferable model for representing the essential properties of Hume’s 
examples may well be the Stag Hunt Game.23  This coordination game
also includes two equilibria.  And, again, one equilibrium, in which both 
men row, and drain, is the most advantageous, while the other, in which 
both opt for playing alone, is less advantageous.  Now opting for the less 
advantageous equilibrium is safer because its success does not depend on 
the other partner (figure 2).  Thus, there is no guarantee that the players 
will follow their best joint strategy. 
21. RUSSELL HARDIN, DAVID HUME: MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORIST 78–79 (2007).
22. EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 79 (1977). 
23. BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 2 
(2004). 
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FIGURE 2: STAG HUNT GAME 
 Player 2 
Player 1 
Row/Drain Defect 
Row/Drain  2 ʜ  2 0 ʜ  1 
Defect 1 ʜ  0 1 ʜ  1 
Unlike what the models might suggest, Hume says that the potential
gains resulting from the conventions of justice are not seen immediately. 
Instead, the rules of justice are strengthened by a “slow progression” and 
by “our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it.”24 
It is evident that standard game-theoretical tools are too simplistic to model
this process because they do not consider the feedback mechanisms that
operate when participants’ motivational and cognitive systems change 
over time in response to new environments that are produced by the
unexpected consequences of their prior decisions. 
Justice is eventually established by convention when people “have had 
experience enough to observe, that whatever may be the consequence of 
any single act of justice, performed by a single person, yet the whole system 
of actions, concurred in by the whole society, is infinitely advantageous 
to the whole, and to every part.”25  While each act of justice on its own 
does not express a natural moral sentiment, the whole system of justice is 
advantageous to society.  This system requires compliance with the directives
of a system of alienable property rights and reliable promises and contracts. 
When societies become larger and more complex, legal institutions 
substitute the conventions.  In fact, in modern societies, where land is no 
longer abundant and population density makes non-legal patterns of 
transactional justice unviable, general utility demands institutionalizing 
these rules by defining property rights with greater precision, providing 
rules for controversial cases and establishing a system of settlement and 
enforcement that changes the payoffs of players to solve assurance problems 
in Stag Hunt and Prisoners’ Dilemma situations.  Conventions alone may
be too rudimentary for resolving difficult cases.  For instance, conventional 
rules might fail to establish, at least unambiguously, whether a good faith 
buyer has a right to keep the purchased good if the sold good was stolen 
or lost. As I said, the evolution of Roman law is an example of how 
24. HUME, supra note 4, at 315. 
25. Id. at 319 (emphasis added). 
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specialized settlement and public ascertainment can supplement initially
well-functioning transactional rules. 
The transactional conception of justice and its institutionalization in 
legal structures do not raise a special problem for the application and 
settlement of these rules in international disputes. There is no denying 
that domestic regulation is sometimes insufficient for the protection of 
justice in these disputes. Thus, the transnational enforcement of property 
rights and contracts requires both norms for conflicts of national laws and
international judicial cooperation.  For instance, treaties regulate international 
sale contracts and the protection of foreign investments, and there are 
various international arbitration mechanisms for disputes in those areas.
Since these international institutions are concerned with transactional
justice, it might be farfetched to call them forms of global justice.  More 
accurately, we could say that they are just international instruments for
the cross-border implementation of transactional forms of justice. 
Among the rules that shape the institutions of transactional justice as 
publicly ascertained in a legal system, I have distinguished elsewhere two
types: “structural rules” and “positional rules.”26  Structural rules define
the abstract structure of rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that
characterize those institutions.  Positional rules establish the positions of
concrete persons within the abstract structure.  In other words, they specify 
the concrete rights, liberties, powers, and immunities held by particular 
persons. The two types of rules work in tandem and positional rules are 
often derivative from structural rules.  For instance, structural rules establish 
the powers of the owner, and one of those powers is to sell his or her property. 
Therefore, the positional rule that assigns the ownership of a legitimately
sold good to the buyer derives from the structural rule that defines the 
powers of the seller.
Except in marginal or hard cases, positional rules specify the holdings 
to which each person has an erga omnes right.  Entitlement has no meaning 
outside the set of positional rules established in a public legal system.  In 
a precise, complete, and well-articulated system of property, there is no 
room for a theory of distributive justice.  “Distributive justice” would just
amount to the perfect compliance with the public system of property.  That 
is, once basic property rights are defined by structural rules and assigned 
to particular individuals by positional rules, successive allocations of 
26.  Horacio M. Spector, An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial
Property Rights, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 270, 273 (1989).
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holdings are conducted by means of exchange contracts in the marketplace.
Although the rules that establish the initial allocation are politically
contentious, exchanges are regulated in less contentious forms by legal rules
in accordance with ideals of transactional equity.  Administration of this
system of property requires arbitration or judicial settlement for particular 
disputes, but not the kind of distributional management that associational
justice demands. 
III. THE ASSOCIATIONAL CONCEPTION
Unlike the transactional conception, the associational conception of 
justice presupposes the establishment of a free and voluntary association
by covenant or custom.  An association can be established in a customary 
or formal way when a number of individuals consent or acquiesce to the
establishment of and membership in an organization defined in terms of
certain foundational goals. Rather than a transaction or series of actual
transactions, the free association is a normative structure that reduces 
transaction costs by regulating the relations of members with respect to 
the association and of the association with respect to nonmembers.
Associations relevant for the associational conception of justice are those 
that respect the fundamental moral rights of members and nonmembers 
and the social rules of justice established by transactional justice.  Therefore, 
associations that uphold patriarchal rule, slavery, looting, and other practices 
that violate fundamental moral rights or conventional duties established 
by customary norms of transactional justice are ruled out from the domain
of associational justice.
Essential to a free association is the establishment of common or shared 
goals, and the organization of a regime of division of labor that assigns 
specialized roles and functions.  The national State, that is, the political
association, can be considered an association in this sense.  However,
because of the extent of its impact on the lives of members and nonmembers,
the free character of a political community must be secured by a variety
of special institutional arrangements, though I will not address this topic 
here. The incorporation of an association is not an exchange contract
because its point is to substitute a whole series of separate contracts.  The 
contract constituting an association is a charter that reduces transaction
costs by avoiding a great number of complex separate transactions.  One 
single contract, whether written or informal, substitutes a whole series of 
actual and potential contracts.27 
A contract that constitutes an association must include two different
kinds of rules.  First, “governance rules” define the rights and powers of 
27. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937). 
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members in the governance of the association.  Second, “distributive rules” 
have a dual role. On the one hand, they define the gains and losses caused
by the association.  Without a definition of the “common pool” of benefits 
and burdens, the question of fair division is unintelligible.  On the other 
hand, distributive rules establish how the association’s surplus—benefits and
costs—must be distributed among members in light of the shared goals 
that the association is meant to serve. Therefore, distributive rules define 
a new form of property rights: rights to a share of the associational surplus. 
The concept of fair share is not meaningful without a background 
association and a common pool of benefits and costs. 
Some associations probably started in a spontaneous way as evolving 
patterns of labor division, for example, families and tribes.  But beyond a 
certain degree of organizational complexity, an association requires a formal 
normative system that creates a governance structure and provides enforcement 
mechanisms, for example, expulsion.  Political associations require a written 
or customary constitution.  How much of the behavioral pattern giving 
rise to a political association can be explained by game theoretical tools? 
Game theory can explain cooperative equilibriums in different scenarios:
for instance, coalitions.  However, I doubt that the existence and maintenance
of a political association can be reducible to a set of equilibriums.  Although 
a political association involves a complex set of connected games, it also 
involves a normative structure and a collective internal viewpoint linked
with that structure. One tricky feature of political associations is that their 
identity is not defined in terms of its members and their possible interactions.
Associations can change in various ways over time and their identity is 
defined largely in a shared discourse that creates a we-perspective. Within 
that collective perspective members mutually understand and accept the
association’s missions and functions, the domain of associational benefits
and burdens, and the bodies and procedures that are indispensable for the 
governance of the association. 
The classic conception of justice as giving each person his due presupposes 
a system of property rights such as that established by Hume’s social
conventions or specified by formalized legal rules, for example, Roman
law. In contrast, associational justice is a sort of emergent property of
associations of various kinds.  Typically, an association generates burdens 
and benefits, and the fair division of such burdens and benefits is the subject 
matter of associational justice.  Unlike the classic conception of justice,
associational justice concerns the distribution and redistribution of joint 
or shared losses/gains.  Because distribution and redistribution must be
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done in a way that maintains the effectiveness and stability of the 
association, the question of fairness can be raised, for example, in terms 
of what system of distribution and redistribution is best tailored to the 
nature and goals of the respective association. Distributive justice in this 
sense is just the variety of associational justice that corresponds to political
associations.
My account of associational justice is pluralistic because it focuses on 
the various kinds of associations and their impact on the distributive 
criteria that are to be applied to each kind.28  As the term pluralism is used 
in different senses in political theory, it is important to emphasize that it
is the plurality of associations that sorts out distributional principles in my
argument. Other “pluralities,” such as the plurality of social goods or the 
plurality of the grounds of justice, play no role.  Therefore, my pluralistic 
account is to be distinguished from Walzer’s “complex equality” theory
of justice. Walzer thinks that different political societies establish various
sets of distributive principles, and that various categories of social goods 
within each society are to be subject to different distributive criteria.29 
Tyranny is then defined as the extrapolation of the criteria applicable to 
one sphere of justice to another one, disregarding the meanings of the 
social goods pertinent to each sphere.30  This is not the type of pluralism I 
defend. Unlike Walzer’s focus on a typology of social goods, my focus
is on a categorization of political associations.  I argue that each kind of 
political association raises particular questions of fair division and different 
distributive criteria, and that those criteria can only be understood and 
justified against the background of a prior definition of the character and
scope of the association.  On this view, it is mistaken to defend a pattern 
of distribution in one kind of association on the grounds of a distributive 
criterion that is proper to a different kind of association—without a prior 
self-transformation of the former association. 
Although this is not the place to take a stand on the choice of a particular
political association, I am inclined to think that no political association can
be singled out as the morally best political association.  Instead, various
political associations are consistent with the fundamental moral rights of
human beings (freedom, equality, etc.) and with the rules of transactional
justice. Of course, we must exclude those heinous associations that violate
the fundamental equal standing of individuals by allowing or establishing 
domination, social hierarchies (e.g., castes), and forms of wealth accumulation 
that are not congenial with the goals and missions of any free and voluntary
 28. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
6 (1983).
29. See id. at 21–26. 
30. See id. at 19–20. 
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association. However, within the moral constraints of rights and duties 
and other moral reasons, what association is better for a given society is a 
matter of collective choice, not of moral truth.
A. The Reference Pool Problem 
It is often unnoticed that problems of associational justice do not have 
a unique and universal solution, that is, a single solution that is true of 
every kind of association.  Various solutions are always available, and the 
correct selection of one solution can only be done, if at all, with reference 
to the proper pool of costs and benefits.  In turn, the reference pool problem 
can be solved with a proper interpretation of the character, kind, and missions 
of the relevant associations. In this section, I would like to emphasize two 
fundamental points about associational justice.  First, indeterminacy with
respect to the rules that define the pool of costs and benefits and the resulting 
surplus generally gives rise to various competing conceptions of justice 
for a given association.  Second, the choice among such conceptions is pool 
dependent in that it depends largely on the reference pool.  Since two or 
more reference pools are often available, the concepts of “fair share” and 
“fair division” presuppose a determination of the pooling adopted by each
association, which in turn depends on its nature and kind.  Indeed, the
character, kind, missions and goals of the association are sometimes clear
indicators of the scope of the association’s common pool of benefits and 
costs. An example will help to illustrate both points. 
Three Families: Suppose three families are planning their summer holidays 
in Cancun. Each family has mom and dad plus two kids.  Families A and
B have one boy and one girl.  Family C has two boys.  Parents get the 
following information about lodging expenses: a double room in their 
favorite hotel costs $250 per day; they are also informed that a quadruple 
room costs $350 per day.  The hotel does not have triple rooms.  The three
families plan to stay in the hotel for 10 days.  Setting aside the rooms for 
the parents, each family will spend $2500 in children’s lodging if the kids 
of each family share a double room.  Kids’ preferences are as follows: each
kid is prepared to share a room with his/her sibling; each girl is prepared to
share a room with another girl, but not with a boy from a different family, 
and each boy is prepared to share a room with another boy. 
Consider now two different versions of this story:
(a) Friends. The parents of the three families have been friends for a 
long time and have made a habit of sharing holidays.  One of the parents 
develops the idea of inviting the four boys to share a four-bed room and
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offering the two girls to share a double room, thus reducing the overall 
lodging costs.  Though the boys know that they will have more fun in the 
quadruple room, they are also aware that they will have to share the
bathroom among four, so they are prepared to accept the arrangement only
as a way of sparing family expenses.  The two girls also say yes. 
(b) Acquaintances. The kids are mates in school and the parents have 
met each other occasionally in family parties at the school.  The parents 
know that they do not have common interests and that they are not going 
to become friends.  The four boys develop the idea of sharing a four-bed 
room, assuming that the two girls will be able to share a double room. 
Though they know that they will have more fun in the quadruple room, 
they are also aware that they will have to share the bathroom among four, 
so they prefer this arrangement only as a way of sparing family expenses.
The two girls also say yes. 
If the saving-cost plan proposed is agreed on, in any version of the story, 
we can conclude that the families have formed a kind of association and 
that this association will allow them to save lodging costs.  First, the 
informal association, even if it is a single purpose one, reduces transaction 
costs by avoiding the two complex sublease agreements that a transactional 
procedure would otherwise demand.  Second, the room-sharing plan yields a
clear reduction of costs.  In the initial scheme, with the kids of each family 
sharing a double room, the three families will spend a total amount of $7500. 
With the new arrangement, they will spend an overall amount of $6000. 
So there is an associational surplus, namely, a cost reduction of $1500. 
Unfortunately, the agreement reached is incomplete, and they have not 
established any distributional rule for the surplus.  So the parents engage 
in an interpretive debate about the true conception of distributive justice 
in associations of this kind. 
In both versions of the story, the mixed-siblings parents propose to 
divide the overall expenditure of $6000 in three equal shares of $2000,
thus assigning to each family an equal right of $500 in the overall surplus. 
However, the two-boy parents think it is fair for them to pay 50% of the 
cost of the room that their sons are going to use, thus claiming to spend 
only $1750, which means sparing an amount of $750, instead of $500.
After all, they reason, why should they be concerned with the costs of the 
girls’ room if they do not have daughters?  Under this distributional pattern, 
each of the mixed-offspring couples will save only $375—instead of $500. 
This is a typical case of distributional contestability caused by the lack
of clarity with respect to the distributive rules established or to be established
in the association.  Most importantly, the rules of the association fail to 
determine the common pool of costs and benefits, and, therefore, the notion 
of “fair share“ is indeterminate. For instance, it is not certain whether the 
cost of the double room belongs to the common pool, or is to be borne 
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only by families A and B. This semantic gap can be filled according to 
various theories. Moreover, as is to be expected in informal associations,
there is also a gap in terms of possible second-order interpretive rules. 
That is, there is no rule establishing how to interpret the rules of the
association when such rules have gaps or are indeterminate in other ways.
As a result of this double indeterminacy, the members of the association 
can intelligibly claim that the rule of allocation “truly” agreed on is the 
one that favors their competing positions. 
Suppose the parents do not want to act strategically, they just want to 
split the surplus in a fair way.  But what does fairness demand in this case?
Dividing up the total surplus in equal shares among the three families, or 
dividing up the rental of the quadruple room in such way that family C
pays half and families A and B a quarter each?  We have assumed that the 
three families’ contributions are separately necessary and jointly sufficient 
for the saving-cost scheme to succeed. Yet this does not entail that the 
egalitarian division of savings is the only permissible distributional pattern. 
In fact, the concept of “fair share” is always relative to a well-defined
common pool.  Given that that definition is not explicitly established by 
the association’s rules, we have to look at the character of the association
in order to demarcate the common pool. In other words, it is not possible 
to assess the two contending interpretive theories without considering the 
nature and kind of association that the families have formed. If the
association does not provide for interpretive rules, the best interpretive 
account should pick out the distributional scheme that serves to realize the 
goals and missions of the association in light of its nature and kind.  The 
associative conception of justice allows various theories of justice depending 
on the nature and aims of each association.  There is nothing such as a 
free-floating criterion of fair division.  Different distributional solutions 
fit best with different kinds of associations.  Social justice is a good 
conception of associative justice for associations that establish a high
degree of collectivization, for example, “common venture” associations. 
For other kinds of associations, it is simply a dysfunctional, incoherent or 
confused account.
The two versions of Three Families present different kinds of associations. 
In version (a), we have an association of friends that share their holidays 
with or without the cost-saving plan. The hotel arrangement is merely
incidental to the main purpose of the association, which is to participate 
in a group experience. On this collectivist conception of the association, 
the egalitarian proposal seems the most reasonable, and the position of the 
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two-boy parents looks like a misunderstanding of the primary aim of the 
association, which is to cultivate friendship and enjoy a common venture.
In contrast, version (b) does not render the position of the two-boy parents
(so) implausible.  Of course, they could be nice and accept splitting the
savings in three equal shares.  But the question is not whether they are 
great people but whether they get it wrong in holding that, as a matter of 
justice, they have to pay half of the only “common” bill, that is, the bill of 
the quadruple room.  They correctly think that this association has one
single purpose, namely, to spare money.  They are not parties to the rental
of the girls’ double room.  They are only parties to one common rental, 
namely, the rental of the quadruple room, and they are prepared to pay 
their prorated share in that rental (50%).  Of course, as reasonable people, 
they do not expect the mixed-siblings parents to pay more than their 
prorated share in that room (25% each couple).  If the parents of families 
A and B insist in dividing the total surplus in equal shares, it might seem 
they do not have a good faith understanding of the kind of association they
have formed.  Why should they expect family C to pay a share of the 
proportionally more expensive double room? 
The conclusion I want to draw from this discussion is that there is no 
theory of fair division that is valid across different types or categories of 
associations.  Rather, in cases of indeterminacy, incompleteness, or
associational reform, we must assess the distributional theories proposed by 
contending participants in light of the character, kind, goals, and functions 
of the association. When the indeterminacy relates to the definition of
the associational surplus, as in Three families, there is no true conception 
of justice for the association at stake that is independent from an
interpretation of its nature and kind. This general point applies to national
political associations, intergovernmental associations, and global
associations as well.
B. Political Associations and Political Justice 
Western political theory often defines the State as a kind of association 
and national law as the set of norms created by that association.  Though 
these definitions are rather basic, they are useful to explain the associational 
conception of justice. Like any other kind of association, the political
association must have certain common and shared goals and a governance 
structure, which is established by a customary or written constitution.  While 
any political association is expected to institutionalize those transactional
rules that are indispensable for a peaceful and productive society, the very
existence of the political association raises a new question, namely, that 
concerning the fair division of collective gains and losses among the members 
of the association.  It is common to call this form of justice “social justice.”
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This is misleading because it suggests that this conception of justice qualifies
a society.  But a society in the sociological sense is not an association in 
the normative sense.  Social justice is an emergent property of political
associations. In the absence of a political association, the discourse of
social justice is misguided, except as an indirect proposal for establishing 
a political association.  Rather than “social justice,” it would be much clearer 
to talk about “political justice” or “national justice”. With respect to social
justice, Aristotle is right in asserting that this form of justice presupposes 
a political association: “[j]ustice . . . belongs to the polis; for justice, which is
the determination of what is just, is an ordering of the political association.”31 
Like nonpolitical associations, a political association is based on a written 
or customary constitution.  There is no society in the political sense that lacks
some kind of  “constitution” (Aristotle) or “basic structure” (Rawls). 
It is not that a society chooses a basic structure, but rather that the basic 
structure establishes a society as a political association.  In fact, in the 
absence of a polis incorporated by a constitution, there would be no problem 
of social justice.
Unlike private associations, the political community has sovereignty, 
which comprehends the powers of self-government and self-transformation. 
A national State may well have a legitimate claim to supreme authority to 
organize its constitutional essentials and to modify them in accordance 
with the changing preferences of its people.  Self-transformative capacities
are a significant aspect of sovereign authority.  This aspect is absent from 
private associations.  Private associations can have greater or lesser capacities 
of self-transformation in accordance with their charters and the regulatory 
measures approved by the sovereign State in which they operate.  But 
national States, at least those that satisfy conditions of moral legitimacy,
have a right of self-determination. This principle is widely recognized in 
international law.32 However, international associations do not have the 
power of self-determination.  A corollary of this is that international
associations can only be changed through the sovereign decision of their
sovereign State members.
Typically, a customary or written charter establishes the essentials of 
the political association.  Among such essentials are the organization of 
departments and different levels of governance; the general point, goals
and functions of the association; the powers, privileges, and prerogatives 
31. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 8 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1948) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
32. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
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of the agencies of the association; forms and procedures of governance; 
the political rights of members, and so on. Following the terminology I 
introduced above, I call these “governance rules.”  In addition, the basic 
charter must establish “distributive rules.”  Distributive rules in political 
associations are of two kinds: (a) rules that define the associational surplus, 
namely, what costs and gains are defined as common pool; and (b) rules 
that establish the division of common costs and benefits among members. 
The problem of just political division of shared gains and losses only 
makes sense against the background of a political association that broadly
defines such sharing and is expected to lay down distributional rules for 
dividing the shared output.  This point has Aristotelian resonance.  In
effect, Aristotle says that the fundamental question in a discussion about 
the ideal constitution is, “[w]hat are the things in which the members of a 
political association are associated, and what is the extent of their
association?”33  Despite the overtones, I do not endorse Aristotle’s most
distinctive views about the political association.  For instance, I do not 
accept that the polis is prior to the individual, and that self-sufficiency is
one of the functions of the polis.  The correct point I think Aristotle’s 
discussion brings out is that distributional justice cannot settle the extent
of associational sharing because that extent is prior to justice. 
Therefore, the problem of social justice in political associations does 
not have a unique solution.  Various associations raise different questions 
of fair division, depending on their character, point, and goals.  An ideal 
constitution would provide either (a) complete and clear answers or
solutions for all the questions or problems that could be raised in light of 
the organizational, structural, and distributive rules of the association; or 
(b) a complete and clear procedure for determining those answers or solutions 
in case the relevant rules are equivocal, incomplete, or indeterminate in
any other way.  Again, various political associations can be expected to have 
different charters or constitutions, and, therefore, different rules of distribution.
IV. KINDS OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATION
I will discuss four kinds of political association and show that each kind 
raises differential problems of fair division or “political justice.” By 
“political association,” I understand a free and voluntary association that 
has and claims to have sovereignty over an ordered pair of territory and
population, where “sovereignty” is defined as the power to issue binding 
rules and directives, and to be free from the dictates of any other higher 
authority.  Real, historical States exemplify one or more of these kinds. 
Because my goal here is just to illustrate general points about the problem 
33. ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 47–48. 
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of associational justice, the following list has no claim to comprehensiveness. 
There may be other kinds of political associations that are consistent with
the fundamental moral rights of members and nonmembers and with the 
demands of transactional justice, but I believe that the discussion of these 
other kinds would have little marginal utility in the context of my argument 
about associational justice. 
A. The Protective Association 
Classical liberals have conceived of the political association as a kind 
of agency that is charged with the responsibility of protecting pre-political 
rights, for example, natural rights, by offering a centralized system of
enforcement as well as a centralized system of settlement of disputes 
concerning the potential violation of those rights.  John Locke’s 
commonwealth is the classic example of a protective association established 
by a covenant, and Robert Nozick’s “dominant protective agency” is the 
contractual precursor of a minimal state that can emerge in ways that are 
not violative of natural rights by a series of individual contracts of provision 
of protection services.34  It is controversial whether any historical State is
an instance of a pure protective association, as most States have pursued 
goals and functions other than the internal security of their members and 
the external defense of the association from external attacks. 
The protective association does not produce collective benefits in a 
strict sense. In fact, this kind of association does not encompass private 
benefits and gains resulting from private productive efforts.  Benefits and 
gains arising out of transactions do not raise a distributional problem for 
the association, since transactional justice allocates property rights without a
pattern of associational justice.  To be sure, there is a shared benefit, namely, 
the avoidance of individual costs and investments in self-defense and/or
hiring of private protection. This benefit is spread throughout the community
because internal and external protection functions as a kind of public good 
that has the double characteristic of non-rival and non-excludable enjoyment. 
However, protective efforts can be allocated in various ways, and protective 
associations oftentimes lack clear and explicit rules for allocation of
protective services.  As far as this question is not clearly or unequivocally 
34. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
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decided by the charter or constitution, this confronts us with a distributive 
problem. 
In any case, the fundamental distributional problem for the protective 
association is how to divide the expenses of the association among all or 
some of its members.  The association needs resources for executing
its protective services, and, in the absence of predatory actions against 
members or nonmembers, those resources must be obtained by a scheme 
of division of costs funded by “taxes” or “fees.”35  In the ideal charter of 
a protective association, the regime of taxation would be stated in a clear,
unequivocal, and complete way.  However, real associational constitutions 
often leave these issues unsettled and, therefore, there is room for various 
theories of fair or equitable taxation.  In fact, historical States have changed 
their systems of taxation over time in response to programs for reform that
stressed the unfairness of previous regimes of taxation. 
B. The Public Goods Association 
In practice, States as protective associations are usually coupled with 
associations entrusted with responsibility for carrying out public works 
that provide public goods in an economic sense.  Though this kind of 
political association goes back to ancient times, for example, Roman
aqueducts, it acquired prominence as a form of regulating private activities in
accordance with the public interest after the Great Depression.  The 
regulatory association is a subspecies of a public goods association that 
started to prevail when the U.S. and European nations accepted the 
proposition that private markets cannot supply such major public goods
as macroeconomic stability and full employment.  The Pigouvian explanation 
of the regulatory association is that market failures make it unrealistic to 
expect members of the association acting on their own to produce the 
desirable levels of various public goods.  As I said above, the major good 
produced by the protective association, that is, internal and external security 
can also be viewed as a public good.  Therefore, we might see the public
goods association as a natural extension of the protective association. 
Classic police power functions, such as public health, hygiene and sanitary
conditions, public roads, public bridges, ports, lighthouses, and some forms
of public transportation, for example, trains are usually cited as examples 
of public goods. Like internal or external security, these public goods have
the dual characteristic of non-rivalry and non-excludability, which avoids
the problem of distributing the enjoyment of such goods. 
Though public education and environmental protection are not public 
goods in a technical sense, they share some features of public goods.  We 
35.  I am ignoring here legal nuances. 
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all have a common interest in living in an educated and civilized society, 
and in democratic regimes we also share an interest in educating new 
members in the essentials and management of the political association. 
The adequate reproduction of the association’s membership is a critical
question when the association is established as a sort of perpetual association. 
In fact, political associations do not generally contemplate procedures for
their own dissolution.  Their existence is meant to continue indefinitely. 
C. The Social Security Association 
In the 1880s, Bismarck established in Prussia the first universal schemes 
of mandatory social insurance regulated by the State.  The historical origin 
of these schemes indicates that they presuppose a degree of “nationalization” 
that exceeds the narrow boundaries of the protective and public goods 
association. During the twentieth century, social insurance schemes spread
over the whole world, fully reaching American shores in 1935 with the
enactment of the Social Security Act.36 
Since those years, it has become common to view the political association 
as an organization capable of regulating or supplying social insurance 
services that private insurance markets could not provide via universal
schemes. Market failures such as self-selection and moral hazard explain 
why, for instance, unemployment insurance schemes are not expected to 
arise in private markets. Bismarck established legal regimes of sickness 
insurance, accident insurance, disability insurance, and retirement.37  All 
these schemes raise special questions of fair division because they include 
a special distributive component like the division of contributions among
workers and employers.  Again, the ideal charter or constitution of a social 
security association should establish the distributional rules that establish
the division of costs among members, but in practice, the constitution or
charter generally fails to provide for specific, explicit rules about these 
issues, which allows debates about the best “theory” of social insurance 
equity.  Legislative measures usually establish various mechanisms of
 36. Social Security Act of 1935, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/
history/35act.html [https://perma.cc/TRA3-K9F7] (last visited Nov. 19 2015).  There were
antecedents of non-universal social legislation in America since the late eighteenth
century: HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES TO 1860 (Clive Day ed., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1938). 
37.  Sidney B. Fay, Bismarck’s Welfare State, 18 CURRENT HISTORY 1–7 (1950). 
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distribution that are vindicated as equitable toward those who could not 
afford to pay similar private insurances.38 
D. The Redistributive or Common Venture Association 
The redistributive association emerged with the Mexican revolution of 
1910 and the Russian revolution of 1917.  In the U.S., Johnson’s Great 
Society can be considered a program for establishing a common venture 
association, and this program has inspired American theorists of social
(domestic) justice.  Since the second half of the nineteenth century, socialists 
have been advocating for the removal of the increasingly uneven distributive
outcomes produced by the operation of the rules of transactional justice in 
the context of an industrial and urban economy.  Their final goal was to
convert nineteenth century political associations into common venture
associations that could substitute the public or social property of the means 
of production for private property and capitalism.  This goal was achieved 
to a greater or lesser extent in various countries at different times, but the 
influence of their advocacy was immense.  Today, the general sense that
a society is a sort of redistributive association surely prevails in Western
intellectual and political circles.
Clearly, the common venture association raises new and vast problems 
of distribution and redistribution. While the Mexican constitution of 1917 
and the Russian constitution of 1918 established redistributive associations
by collectivizing the land and other resources, the distributional rules thereby
established were not so determinate as to solve all the problems of allocation 
that commonly emerge in redistributive associations.39  In a socialist State, 
the basic assumption is that profits, benefits, and gains are forms of social 
wealth that the redistributive association is entitled to allocate according 
to various fairness or distributive standards.  The presence of a distributional 
authority makes the notion of “fair share” meaningful. 
Though socialist charters can establish various forms of socialist or 
social democratic distributive regimes short of communist or socialist
property, they agree on the basic principle that social wealth is an associational 
asset to be distributed among the members of the association.  If the best
form of distribution coincides, totally or partially, with the form of 
distribution that would result from market mechanisms working according 
to the classic rules of justice, this would be just a contingent result that is 
not obligatory as a matter of justice.  As a matter of justice, the association










is, individuals who do not want to voluntarily enter the dominant 
U.S.S.R. CONSTITUTION ch. 2; MEXICAN CONSTITUTION  art. 27.
1100
SPECTOR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016 9:01 AM     
  




















   
 
    
  
   
  
 
[VOL. 52: 1077, 2015] Two Conceptions of Justice 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
is empowered to allocate wealth, income, and other goods in accordance 
with various criteria. Since the association has distributional authority, 
property rights can be awarded to individuals, but only on a temporary 
and precarious basis. For instance, even if business executives have legal
rights to the profits of their investments, such profits are not theirs in a 
deep moral sense.  The association has a sort of all-encompassing eminent
domain over all assets whose exercise does not require any specific
declaration of public use, let alone previous compensation to legal owners. 
From the standpoint of the redistributive association, legal property rights 
are revocable licenses or precarious rights that, as a matter of justice, can
be curbed or canceled by the authorities of the association whenever the 
demands of justice call for other forms of allocation of private property or 
call, more radically, for the collective or public forms of property.  While 
in practice the redistributive association can be implemented through 
various mixed economic systems, which allow greater or lesser governmental 
meddling with markets, the basic charter does not assume individual 
moral entitlements on any asset, wealth, or income, except essential goods 
that can be characterized as “personal property,” for example, clothes,
bikes, or toothbrushes.  The moral premise is that all assets are, as a matter
of justice, constantly subject to distribution and redistribution.
The most famous example of a theory of fair division for a redistributive 
association is Rawls’s theory of justice.40  Rawls premises his theory of 
justice for a “national society” on an abstract interpretation of society as 
a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”41  As Philip Pettit points out, 
“[t]his assumption casts society as an active association of people with a 
common goal and common resources of action.”42  On this assumption, 
Rawls seeks to establish the principles that should “provide a way of
assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society” and “define the
appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”43 
Rawls does not ask, what are the principles that define the domain of society’s 
gains and losses, as opposed to their members’ gains and losses.  He takes 
this issue to be settled by his conception of society, as a “cooperative venture,” 
which entails that all “primary goods,” namely, rights and liberties, wealth
 40. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74 (rev. ed. 1999).   
41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Philipp Pettit, The Rawlsian Ideal, PRINCETON INDEP., http://princetonindependent.
com/issue01.03/item10b.html [https://perma.cc/WNR8-ECMP] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
43. RAWLS, supra note 40, at 4. 
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and income, the social bases of self-respect, et cetera, are societal resources.44 
Rawls’s famous two principles of justice govern the basic structure of a 
redistributive association, where “basic structure” is understood as the set 
of norms and institutions that regulate the political, legal, and economic 
organization of a society so conceived.45 
The important point is that the total surplus generated by the members 
of society is, as a matter of justice, subject to distribution and redistribution 
among all the members.  Two fundamental tasks of the basic structure 
are precisely to demarcate the domain of the goods included in social
ownership and to establish the principles or rules of distribution. This 
kind of conception of society is laid down in socialist constitutions, but is
completely alien to the historical American constitution, as interpreted 
according to any plausible exegetical methodology.  However, historical
constitutions, even socialist ones, do not provide for specific rules of
distribution.  Instead of explicit rules, they use vague and equivocal concepts 
that only indicate in a rough way what kind of distribution the drafters 
have in mind, such as “fair,” “classless,” “collective property,” “elimination 
of poverty,” and so on. More often than not, the constitutions that offer 
the institutional settings in which such theories of justice are proposed 
were not originally conceived as charters for redistributive associations,
and, consequentially, the need for new “theories” of justice and “new” theories 
of “constitutional interpretation” is even more pressing. 
V. THE CONTESTABILITY OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS
What is the nature of Rawls’s conception of society? As is well known,
Rawls differentiates between “concepts” and “conceptions.”46 Concepts 
that denote social and institutional practices are value-laden.  Therefore,
the concrete definition of such practices is essentially contestable because 
their assessment is multi-dimensional and there is no agreed-on criterion 
for prioritizing such dimensions.  Therefore, reaching an uncontroversial
conclusion about the concrete demands of the practice is always impossible.47 
Various conceptions or “interpretations” of a concept stress different
dimensions or features and express divergent value judgments about the 
point, goals, and functions of the practice.  Rawls’s conception of justice 
44. Id. at 54. 
45. Id. at 76. 
46. Id. at 9. 
47. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 152–53 (1986); RAWLS, supra note 40, 
at 74; W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 
177 (1955–1956); Christine Swanton, On the “Essential Contestedness” of Political Concepts, 
95 ETHICS 811, 814 (1985). 
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as fairness is an interpretation of the principles of justice that should govern 
a redistributive political association.48 
Some social practices are not institutionalized and present more difficult 
problems of interpretation.  One telling example is art.  Since its point, 
goals, and functions are not formally expressed in a set of values, principles, 
or rules, the primary controversial matter is how to express the mutually 
understood values, principles, or rules that govern art.  Diverse theories 
stress various possible features of art, and according to some theories 
surrealism is more valuable than romanticism, and cubism is a better 
expression of art than expressionism.  There is ample room for interpretive 
disagreement. Generally, the codification of embodied values, principles, 
and rules is a controversial matter, because various participants in the practice
may have different views, even though they must have a core agreement
for any social practice to exist.  Codification is then the first contestable 
matter to be addressed before picking out one “true” conception or 
interpretation of the practice.  Social interpretation in this sense is value-
laden and includes what Continental social theorists call Verstehen.49 
In a similar vein, political associations established by a customary
constitution raise the problem of contestable codification of the values,
principles, and rules of the association. Constitutional interpretation in 
this case is a form of social interpretation, rather than sematic exegesis.
However, written constitutions often establish the essentials of a political
association.  Textually chartered associations may allow room for “conceptions” 
or “interpretations” depending on the degree of determinacy of the 
constitutional text.  Constitutional texts may be vague, equivocal, incomplete, 
or in other forms indeterminate.  Even if the legal text is indeterminate, it 
could establish rules for its interpretation. For example, Andres Bello’s 
Civil Code states in Article 19: “[w]hen a law’s meaning is clear, its literal 
import shall not be disregarded under the pretext of consulting its spirit. 
When the law’s terms are obscure, however, one may turn to its clear
intent, spirit, or legislative history.”50  In the following Article, the Chilean 
Code declares, “law’s words shall be taken in their natural and obvious 
sense, in accordance with ordinary usage.”51 In fact, constitutional texts
seldom lay down interpretive rules, not even broad ones such as Bello’s. 
48. RAWLS, supra note 40, at 9. 
49. Theodore Abel, The Operation Called Verstehen, 54 AM. J. SOC. 211, 211–13 
(1948).
50. ÁNGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW 490 (2d ed. 2011). 
51. Id.
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Therefore, if the meaning of a clause in the constitutional text is indeterminate,
there is a dual normative or semantic gap: first, the constitution does not
provide a solution for a possible case; second, the constitutional text has 
a second-order gap because it does not contain interpretive rules that are 
meant to be applied to the interpretation of first-order rules.  The second-
order indeterminacy exacerbates the first-order indeterminacy.  Imperfect
constitutional texts encourage various “conceptions” or “interpretations” 
of the constitutional practice, and such conceptions and interpretations 
routinely involve theories of constitutional interpretation. 
When the rules and principles that establish the character, goals and 
missions of the political association are indeterminate, either because of a
first-order semantic indeterminacy or incompleteness, or because of 
a second-order exegetical indeterminacy or incompleteness, the very nature 
of the political association could become contestable.  The central question is
what kind of political association is ours?  Is it a protective, a public 
goods, a social security or a common venture association? Constitutional 
drafters generally include vague clauses that leave the nature of the 
association indeterminate.  For example, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
in the U.S. Constitution has allowed government to expand the powers of 
the federal Government into areas originally reserved to the people, or the
States.52  Given the lack of determinacy in constitutional texts, political 
associations exert both de facto and de jure power of self-definition and 
self-transformation via constitutional interpretation. Because of this, the 
very nature, goals, and functions of the State become a contestable matter. 
The object of the association becomes contestable because of the contestability
of the constitutional text.  Because not only the first-order text of the 
Constitution allows interpretive discretion, but also the often-inexistent
set of second-order exegetical rules, various participants can claim the 
Constitution permits, or perhaps requires, the association to be/become a
redistributive association, rather than just a protective association, or one
entrusted with the provision of public goods. 
Social justice claims could obviously be presented as critical appraisals 
of existing institutions or as programs for constitutional reform, but in the 
American context they are often framed in terms of social and 
constitutional interpretation. Constitutional elasticity makes it possible for 
some participants, for example, politicians, law professors, judges, et
cetera, to view the political association as a redistributive association.  By
hypothesis, the rules of fair division of social or collective wealth are not 
52. U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 316
(1819). 
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established either.53  Constitutional contestability in the definition of the
category of political association may then lead to another form of
contestability. 
Once the Constitution is interpreted as a “socialist” constitution, it 
raises the problem of fair division of societal resources.  It is important to
note that by a “socialist” constitution I do not mean socialist in the economic 
sense. As is well known, Rawls was not a supporter of state socialism or 
even liberal socialism.  In fact, he suggested property-owning democracy
as an alternative to “welfare-state capitalism,” “state socialism,” and “liberal
socialism.”54  By a “socialist” constitution, I mean a constitution that rejects at 
the deep moral level that individuals have individual property rights that 
morally constrain the range of possible organizations of capital.  In a “socialist”
constitution, such regimes are to be picked out with a view to realizing the
principles of justice. As a contingent matter, it might turn out that the best
regime tolerates private property under certain conditions. In fact, the 
rejection of individual property rights at the deepest level of the theory is 
consistent with various regimes of organizing the ownership of capital,
even one that allows a good deal of private property, like Meade’s property-
owning democracy.55  A “socialist” Constitution is a constitution that rejects
private property as a matter of justice and endorses instead a general regime
of public or collective property as a matter of justice. 
As long as a socialist conception of the political association is adopted, 
the constitutionally required kind of political association becomes a 
redistributive one, and the concept of social justice comes in, but generally
only in a very vague and contestable form.  To be sure, it is now understood 
that the political association is a redistributive association and that one of 
its goals is to ensure a fair distribution of all benefits and burdens arising 
out of social cooperation.  This means that “society” is entitled to fairly divide 
the whole economic output among its members according to principles of
justice. While society’s entitlement to social wealth is assumed, it is recognized 
that the charter of the redistributive association is not there. An ideal
redistributive charter would lay down principles of fair division, but the
Equal Protection Clause does not even mention equality of opportunities, let 
 54. RAWLS, supra note 40, at xiv–xv. 
 53.  If they were established, then it would be clear from the start that the Constitution 
55. 
establishes a distributional association.  
See J.E. MEADE, EFFICIENCY, EQUALITY AND THE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY 40
(1964). 
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alone fair equality of opportunities.56  Because the redistributive association 
is interpreted on the basis of socially recognized ideals, the principles of 
justice should also be found out in a conception of justice that must be 
constructed. 
At that point, philosophical interpreters must supplement the work of 
constitutional interpreters.  So philosophical interpreters go about proposing 
conceptions of social justice that are more or less radical depending on 
their political views about how to redefine the kind, goals, and functions 
of the political association.  Needless to say, this vast scale process of
social interpretation is often done without considering the rules of 
constitutional amendment established in the constitutional text.  For instance, 
in Rawlsian jargon, since the Constitution embodies a liberal conception 
of citizens, we must regard them as “free and equal” citizens whose ideal 
choice setting is a highly idealized “original position” that lacks any 
commonality with the political debates that gave rise to the historical
association. Once the principles of justice are constructed in this way,
they should guide the legislative and executive measures of the political
association, and, hopefully, a future amendment of the Constitution that puts
its text in line with the principles of justice so constructed. 
VI. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
If global justice is a form of social justice at the global level, then we 
must assume that the global community is a cooperative venture for 
mutual benefit.  Customary International Law, which is the analog of the 
social conventions of justice, establishes classic conventions of  “international 
justice.”  It is natural to view these conventions as cooperative equilibriums 
in Stag Hunt games.57  International customs include, for instance, the
criminalization of piracy, the principle pacta sunt servanda, diplomatic 
immunities, and so on.  Yet none of these conventions raises a question of 
global socioeconomic distribution or redistribution.  Like the conventions 
of domestic transactional justice, international customs are minimal rules 
that assume a background of general respect for other nations’ public and 
private property rights.  If there is room for global justice, it should be 
looked for at the level of treaties and international associations. 
VII. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
Since the aftermath of the Second World War, the international system
can be regarded as a set of interconnected international associations of 
56. U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. SKYRMS, supra note 23, at 3. 
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different kinds with different purposes and functions.  The major organization 
is the United Nations, whose charter was signed in San Francisco in 1945.58 
The United Nations was meant to substitute the League of Nations, which
was established in 1919 with the explicit but ineffectual purpose of
maintaining world peace.59 
A. The Peace Association 
There is no doubt that the major goal of the international system is to
avoid war and maintain peace. In fact, since the Treaties of Westphalia 
the goal of valuable intergovernmental pursuits has been to preserve peace 
by protecting the equal sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States.
The Treaties also established the right of Christians to practice their 
religion regardless of the church established in their State, which was the 
first step toward the recognition of international human rights as constraints 
imposed on the sovereignty of States. 
Unlike constitutional lawyers, international lawyers do not disagree 
about the proper character of the UN charter.  There is no doubt that the 
charter establishes an intergovernmental peace association.  The charter
says that “all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means” and “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”60  One of the organs established by the charter is the International
Court of Justice, which has voluntary jurisdiction for settling disputes among 
States.61 
Because the peace association seeks to supply a kind of international
public good, namely, a peaceful world, the benefits are spread over the 
world and no question about the distribution of benefits can possibly be
raised. Yet it is possible to raise the question about the division of burdens. 
For instance, the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the United 
Nations General Assembly decides on the scale of assessments for 
contributions to the Regular Budget.62  The scale of assessments reflects 
a country’s capacity to pay as measured by such factors as its national 
58.  U.N. Charter pmbl. 
59. History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/ 
history/ [https://perma.cc/7HH8-YNJZ] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
60.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 3–4. 
61.  U.N. Charter art. 7, ¶ 1. 
62.  G.A. Res. 45/248, § B, ¶ VI (Dec. 21, 1990). 
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income and population.63 The US pays the largest contribution to the
UN.64 
B. The Trade Association 
Perhaps the first serious attempt at establishing a pro-trade 
intergovernmental organization is the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.65 The explicit goals 
of the IMF are to promote global monetary cooperation, secure financial
stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and 
sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.66 The 
idea of the so-called Bretton Woods Institutions was to prevent a new era 
of trade protectionism via monetary and exchange policies that could 
create such economic tensions as those that led to a wave of hysterical 
nationalism in Germany, which eventually caused the Second World War.67 
Today the free trade association is one tangible reality of the international 
system.  The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations established 
in 1994 the current international trade association, called World Trade 
Organization (WTO).68  The Final Act of the Uruguay Round resolved to 
“develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading 
system.”69  According to Article II, “[t]he WTO shall provide the common 
institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members.”70  Essential to this framework is the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2).71  The
visible goal of the settlement system is to prevent retaliatory measures that
could diminish free international trade. 
Parties to the Agreement recognize that “there is a need for positive 
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the 
least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international
63. G.A. Res. 67/238, ¶ 5 (Dec. 24, 2012).  Peacekeeping operations have their own 
budget, with discounts for poor countries. 
64. Id. ¶ 11. 




 68. Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm [https://perma.cc/R7SB-JKG3] (last
visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
69. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 155 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
70. Id. at 155–56. 
71. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
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trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”72 
Such positive efforts related with international trade are, for example,
special provisions for releasing developing countries from requirements 
that could be burdensome for their economies.  For example, Articles 65, 
66, and 67 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), administered by the WTO, establish transitional
periods of application and encourages forms of technical cooperation for 
the benefit of developing and least-developed countries.73  For instance, 
least-developed countries were not required to comply with the obligation 
to establish minimum standards of legal protection of intellectual property 
rights for a transitional period of ten years.74  However, it is important to
note that the “positive efforts recognition” should not be interpreted as a 
regime of global redistribution of benefits arising out of international 
trade. Aaron James cites this recognition as part of “standing trade law” in 
arguing for principles of structural equity that are internal to the international 
trade system.75  James’s claim is interesting but very contentious, for that 
statement of recognition is a part of the preamble to the WTO treaties, and,
according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, preambles 
are not per se binding but provide the context for interpreting the binding 
clauses of a treaty.76 
It is uncontroversial that the point of the multilateral trading system is
to enter “into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.”77 
Free trade is the most effective way to reduce global poverty and WTO is 
the most effective international instrument for achieving this goal.78 
However, a multilateral trading system and its associated dispute settlement
body are not meant to establish a global redistributive association. 
72.  Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 69, 1867 U.N.T.S. at 154. 
73. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299. 
74. Id.
 75. AARON JAMES, FAIRNESS IN PRACTICE: A SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 148 (2012).
 76. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 69, 1867 U.N.T.S. at 154; Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 2, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 332, 340. 
77.  Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 69, 1867 U.N.T.S. at 154. 
78. LOREN E. LOMASKY & FERNANDO R. TESÓN, JUSTICE AT A DISTANCE, EXTENDING
FREEDOM GLOBALLY  158, 171 (2015). 
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C. The Public Goods Association 
Many international associations pursue the international provision of 
public goods, especially in cases in which the lack of an international 
consensus can cause permanent damages to the ecosystems.  The public
goods association is no different from its counterpart at the domestic level. 
Whereas domestic regulation is useful for internalizing negative local 
externalities, international regulation is needed for internalizing negative 
remote externalities.79  Just as the domestic public goods association is a 
national form of cooperation for mutual benefit, the international public 
goods association is an intergovernmental form of cooperation for mutual
benefit. 
Public goods are defined in terms of actual or expectable preferences of 
groups of persons.  There is no need to appeal to moral standards or principles
to justify the provision of public goods.  Though a utilitarian case could 
be made, in fact, it would be superfluous, for utilitarian justifications become
relevant when the Pareto principle is not satisfied and some people’s gains 
must compensate others’ losses.80  In a typical public goods situation, the
Pareto principle is satisfied by collective regulation because market
mechanisms cannot be expected to produce the optimal level of the desired
good.
The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 is a clear instance of the 
intergovernmental public goods association.81  Principle 6 of the Declaration, 
for example, provides “[t]he discharge of toxic substances or of other 
substances and the release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as 
to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must
be halted in order that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon 
ecosystems.”82  Pollution is one of the remote externalities the Declaration 
encourages State members to prevent through legislative and executive 
policies.  Thus, Principle 7 says, “states shall take all possible steps to prevent 
pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human
79. For the distinction between local and remote externalities, see David Schmidtz, 
The Institution of Property, in  THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING
THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 119 (Roger E. Meiners & 
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000).  The distinction is based on Ellickson’s similar distinction 
between small, medium, and large events.  See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 
YALE L.J. 1315, 1325, 1327–35 (1993). 
80. ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 4–13 (1985).
81. G.A. Res. 2994 (XXVII), Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
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health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or 
to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.”83 
The Declaration is not concerned with fairness, equity, or any value 
other than the collective provision of a public good, namely, the protection
and improvement of the environment.  If there is any kind of justice here 
contemplated, it is rather intergenerational justice, but it is a form of 
intergenerational justice that is quite distant from Rawls’s concern with 
distributive fairness across generations. Though Principle 2 of the Declaration
says “[t]he natural resources of the earth . . . must be safeguarded for the
benefit of present and future generations, through careful planning or 
management,” it is clear that the goal is to avoid the depletion of such 
resources, and that “careful planning and management” does not mean
global collectivization of natural resources.84  In this declaration, there are
no traces of a regime of global ownership of natural resources that fall
under the sovereignty of State members. 
D. The Humanitarian/Human Rights Association 
Since the first Geneva Convention in 1864, the protection of civilians, 
shipwrecked personnel, and prisoners of war has been one of the main
concerns of the international system.85  Broadly regarded as a humanitarian
association, its first stated purpose was to protect non-combatants in wartime. 
Another group of vulnerable people that deserved intergovernmental concern
was workers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) of 1919 survived
the demise of the League of Nations and became an agency of the United 
Nations.86  The ILO’s goal is to promote international labor standards and
universal workers’ rights involving such issues as improvement of conditions
in the working place, decent wages, children’s labor, and job security.87
 83. Id.
 84. Id.
 85. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field. Geneva, 22 Aug. 1864, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.
icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/120?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/K6CV-6JXD] (last visited Dec. 
15, 2015). 
86. Origins and History, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about- 
the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9EU9-A69Q] (last visited Dec. 15, 
2015).
87. ILO Constitution, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p 
=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO [https://perma.cc/JV3R­
9BVM] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
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After the Second War World, the scope of the humanitarian association 
expanded to include progressive standards of respect for human rights. 
Three major international documents, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
the latter two of 1966, could be interpreted as establishing an intergovernmental 
human rights association, as many of those rights exceed the limits of what 
can be broadly characterized as humanitarian concerns.  For instance,
article 21 of the Universal Declaration states “everyone has the right of 
equal access to public service in his country.”88  Though this is a lofty goal
for any legitimate State, we would probably not regard it a demand of 
humanitarian law. Indeed, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
establishes the Human Rights Committee (article 28), whose eighteen
members shall be persons of “high moral character” and “recognized 
competence in the field of human rights,” “considerations being given to 
the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience.”89 
Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights establishes that each State party “undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant.”90  Some of the social rights have socioeconomic
implications.  In accordance with ILO’s conventions, Article 7 establishes 
workers’ right to “fair wages and equal remuneration at work” and “a
decent living for themselves and their families.”91 
The humanitarian/human rights association represents an intergovernmental 
commitment to protect and foster human rights through national policies 
backed by voluntary international assistance and cooperation.  It is clear
that State members maintain the right to noninterference with their domestic 
affairs, except with respect to gross international violations of human
rights, such as those contemplated in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.92  Even in this case, the ICC can only investigate and 
88. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21, ¶ 2 (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
89. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28, Dec. 19, 1966, S.
TREATY DOC. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 179. 
90. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 
1966, S. TREATY DOC. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 4, 5.
 91. Id. at 6. 
92. Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 993
U.N.T.S. 90, 91. 
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prosecute international crimes when the respective State members are
unable or unwilling to do so.93 
Mathias Risse argues that human rights can be regarded as membership
rights in a global order that should recognize the egalitarian ownership of 
world natural resources.  By taking a cue from such natural lawyers as Hugo 
Grotius, Risse defends the following thesis: “Egalitarian Ownership: The
world’s natural resource base belongs in some, possibly rather weak, sense
to humankind collectively.”94  Risse argues that the best interpretation of 
Egalitarian Ownership is common ownership, which he defines as a regime
in which several individuals own a resource and are equally entitled to use it
within constraints.95  On the grounds of common ownership of the earth
and of the intellectual commons, Risse suggests a new interpretation of 
human rights as membership rights in a global order that assumes humanity’s
ownership so conceived.96  Risse draws a whole gamut of normative 
implications from that interpretation of human rights, which range from a 
human right to essential pharmaceuticals to a human right to drinkable 
water.97 
Now Grotius could reasonably think that Christendom was a sort of 
global association under the authority of God, and that members in that 
association had an ownership right to those resources created by God.98 
However, that kind of global order no longer exists. The general principle 
in contemporary international law is that economic resources, both raw 
materials and manufactured products, are placed either under the sovereignty 
of each national State, or under a regime of regulated commons.  Risse’s 
claim that there is a regime of egalitarian ownership of the earth might be 
true with respect to some resources. For instance, Article 87 of the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 1982 prescribes that “[t]he high seas are open to 
all States, whether coastal or land-locked,” and Article 89 establishes that
 93. Id. at 100. 
94. Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 349, 359 (2005). 
95. Id. at 361. 
96. MATHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 209–10 (2012). 
97. See Mathias Risse, The Human Right to Water and Common Ownership of the 
Earth, 22 J. POL. PHIL. 178 (2014); Mathias Risse, Is There a Human Right to Essential 
Pharmaceuticals? The Global Common, the Intellectual Common, and the Possibility of 
Private Intellectual Property 1 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Papers 
Series, Working Paper No. RWP08-074, 2008). 
98. Mark Weston Janis, American Versions of the International Law of Christendom:
Kent, Wheaton and the Grotian Tradition, 39 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 37, 46 (1992). 
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“[n]o State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its 
sovereignty.”99  The Convention puts the high seas in a regime of common 
ownership, provided they are used for “peaceful purposes.”100  In this
respect, the Convention followed Grotius’ teachings.  Yet the high seas 
are an exception rather than the rule. 
Today national sovereignty constrains the program envisaged by global 
justice theorists to carry out a transformation of the humanitarian/human
rights association into a full-fledged redistributive international association. 
In fact, there is no indication in the constitution of the humanitarian or 
human rights association that it is or plans to become a global redistributive
association. Indeed, the opposite is true. Article 1 (1) of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides that “[a]ll peoples have the right of
self-determination.”101 Furthermore, Article 1 (2) states “[a]ll peoples may,
for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic 
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international
law.”102  The only plausible interpretation of this provision is that it denies 
that the international system establishes a global redistributive association 
that is entitled to dispose of the wealth and resources of each State party.
VIII. ARE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS CONTESTABLE? 
Social justice presupposes a pool of shared burdens and benefits, and 
this, in turn, presupposes a political association that declares that its goal 
is to establish a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage” in a redistributive 
sense.103  If the goal of the association is, for instance, a “cooperative
association for the provision of public goods,” the ideal of social justice 
is meaningless.  I think that the defining properties of a political association, 
for example, monopoly of coercion and political representation, do not 
entail on their own the moral requirement to adopt a specific set of
distributional rules.  Indeed, a protective association and a public goods 
political association certainly have those features and still do not 
contemplate explicit redistributive duties and correlative property rights. 
For instance, their constitutions could establish governmental duties 
related to safety, public goods, and social insurance.  It is not morally 
necessary for an association to lay down strong redistributive duties.  As 
99. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, 89, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 432. 
100. Id. at 433. 
101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, supra note 89, 999
U.N.T.S. at 173. 
102. Id.
 103. RAWLS, supra note 40, at 4, 73–74. 
1114
SPECTOR (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016 9:01 AM     
  




     
 
        
    
 

















    
     
[VOL. 52: 1077, 2015] Two Conceptions of Justice 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
long as the association is a voluntary one, it is, however, clearly
permissible for the constitution to establish those duties.  Nor do those 
abstract features per se entail that the members of those associations 
have a moral duty to turn them into redistributive associations. Provided
fundamental moral demands are met, what association one is a member of 
is more a matter of choice than one of moral truth.  This does not preclude 
the possibility for philosophers and constitutional scholars to argue that
there are moral reasons for reforming the constitution in such a way that it
establishes a redistributive association, that is, a setting in which the
problem of the fair division of social wealth can be raised and in which
their various theories can be practically debated and eventually tested. In
the meanwhile, the theories should be understood as programs for an 
associational reform.104  They could more fruitfully be understood as
proposals for associations that already are redistributive associations, or 
are planning to become redistributive associations. 
Proposals for associational reform are always possible, because political 
associations can transform themselves over time.  Self-transformation is
one of the most significant aspects of political sovereignty.  Typically, 
political associations establish rules and procedures for the change or
amendment of their constitutional texts.  If those procedures are not followed, 
some degree of change can be implemented by legislative measures.
However, it is controversial whether a significant change in governmental
powers can be justified by appealing to such general provisions in the
Constitution.  Much depends on the methodology of interpretation adopted.
The more lax the methodology, the lesser need to use the formal amendment
procedures. The scope of potential constitutional interpretations and the
scope of necessary constitutional amendments are, so to speak, complementary
classes.
It is evident that the American political association is no longer a merely 
protective association, and that the amendments to the Constitution have 
not warranted this change. The historical text has been broadly interpreted
to allow the legislative self-transformation of the association into both a 
public goods association and a social security association.  Whether the 
association already has traits of the redistributive association is more
controversial, but I am inclined to answer in the affirmative.  The self­
transformative capacities of the American republic originate from various 
104. They could more fruitfully be understood as proposals for associations that 
already are redistributive associations, or are planning to become redistributive associations. 
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two-layer indeterminacies that its constitutional text offers.  To mention 
one example, the Taxing and Spending Clause, and especially the General
Welfare Clause included in the former (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1),105 
together with the absence of second-order exegetical rules in the Constitution, 
show a degree of indeterminacy and incompleteness that has made it
possible for Presidents and other representatives to propose transformations 
of the political association by legislative and judicial procedures that are 
not contemplated in the procedure of amendment (Article V).106 
For a theory of distributive justice to be conceivable, we need to assume 
a conception of “society” that collectivizes at the basic level economic
resources.  We need, so to speak, socioeconomic sovereignty besides political 
sovereignty.  The State, which is society’s institutional vehicle, should be 
regarded as holder of a sovereign ownership power over all resources, 
regardless of the property claims of its citizens. 
I hope it is by now clear that the problem of social justice as the fair 
division of national economic output can only emerge in a political association
that either (1) is explicitly established by a “socialist” constitution that
declares, as a matter of justice, there is no private property but only collective 
or social property; or (2) is established by an imperfect constitution that
offers mutually reinforcing first-order and second-order indeterminacies
and that, therefore, allows at the limit a socialist interpretation of the
basic system of property to which the Constitution is itself committed. If 
none of these conditions obtains, a “theory of social justice” is merely a 
program for constitutional reform.  The theory could not claim that justice 
requires a fair division of social wealth if the association establishes no 
regime of social wealth. 
Now international associations neither establish a redistributive association 
nor meet the assumption of contestability about their nature that is a 
prerequisite for interpretive self-transformation.  On the contrary, international
associations impose the principle of national sovereignty over the natural
resources placed within the boundaries of national territories.  In addition, 
international treaties do not have vague clauses that can be interpreted as 
establishing a regime of global common ownership, except in some
narrowly specified cases, for example, the high seas.  When the assumption 
of contestability is not met with respect to the determination of the
character and missions of the relevant association, justice theorizing is not 
an exercise in constitutional interpretation—it is an exercise in idealized
institutional design.  Its intellectual interest should not be underestimated, 
nor should its practical importance be overestimated.  Some practical
interest is there, however. Global justice theorizing could present itself as 
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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a programmatic proposal for changing the nature and goals of international
associations. If not served by constitutional interpretation, that change 
could only be introduced by following the rules and procedures of
associational reform.  Unlike national associational self-transformation, 
which is always possible, international self-transformation into a global 
redistributive association requires a prior national self-transformation that 
carries forward sovereignty from national States into some sort of international
sovereign entity. That institutional process involves insurmountable 
complexities.
International associations are not units of sovereign power and, therefore, 
lack the institutional resources for self-definition and self-transformation.
Their reform depends on the sovereign decisions of the national parties to
the relevant treaties.  Self-government is one of the essential qualities of 
a sovereign association, and without self-government, there is no self­
transformative authority.  Without that authority, international associations 
cannot claim to have a sovereign power to redistribute resources from rich
nations to poor nations.  Nor have members of poor nations associational
rights over the resources of other nations.  Thus, global justice interpretation 
cannot provide the conceptual resources for international associations to 
provide authoritative interpretations that recognize redistributive rights. 
Of course, this does not mean that sovereign nations could not establish
in future a global assistance association, but even in that scenario the 
associational “rights” granted by that association would depend on the 
continued generosity and good will of its sovereign State members.
Therefore, they would not be rights in a strict sense.  Unlike a national 
sovereign State, international associations are not free states and, therefore,
the “rights” to global resources they could acknowledge would always be 
gracious concessions, or at most precarious and revocable rights, awarded 
as a matter of humanitarian concern, rather than as a matter of associational 
justice. For full-fledged global justice rights to emerge, national States 
should have to transfer their perpetual sovereignty over their resources to
a global association. Relinquishment of national ownership or eminent 
domain generally involves a constitutional reform and a renunciation of
full sovereignty. In sum, sovereignty over national resources is at odds with 
global justice. It is consistent, still, with various forms of global assistance 
or global solidarity. 
As for the contestability of international associations, which are commonly 
established by treaty, international lawyers are often more orthodox 
in interpreting treaties than some American constitutional scholars in
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interpreting the US Constitution.  I guess that if treaties were amenable to 
broad interpretation techniques, there would be fewer treaties and, 
consequentially, less international cooperation.  Moreover, unlike many 
constitutions, which lack second-order interpretive rules, international 
law provides an explicit interpretive principle in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. In fact, article 31.1 of this convention says that
treaties must be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.”107 This interpretive principle seems 
inconsistent with the style of constructive social interpretation that James tries 
out, which he courageously describes at one point as “an inherently messy 
affair.”108 There is no denial that international treaties often present 
problems of interpretation.  My modest point is that the fundamental norms 
that establish the nature, missions and goals of the relevant associations
are sufficiently clear and determinate.
IX. “GLOBAL JUSTICE” AS A DYSTOPIAN POLITICAL PROGRAM
We have seen that none of the international associations we have 
canvassed establishes, in any plausible interpretation of its aims and rules, 
a global redistributive association. There is no indication at all that all 
States or their peoples have a right to a fair share of global productive 
capital or wealth. Different national political associations establish
various regimes of capital ownership and management.  But there is no 
national political association that considers the capital placed under its 
sovereign jurisdiction as a kind of global asset to be globally redistributed 
to improve the condition of the global poor.  Many international documents
encourage or require State members to provide decent living standards to 
their peoples, though there are no effective enforcement mechanisms in 
this respect.  Various international treaties also recognize that international 
assistance and cooperation can be useful to supplement those national
endeavors. Overall, there is a long way from those documents to a global
redistributive association. In the absence of global ownership of capital 
and wealth, the question of intergovernmental fair division of benefits and
burdens of trade or other forms of cooperation cannot be raised
meaningfully.
Is there any other form of interpreting global justice works?  Whereas 
there are socialist constitutions at the domestic level, there is no global 
socialist constitution. So global justice programs cannot be viewed as 
107. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, supra note 76, 1115 U.N.T.S. 
at 340. 
108. JAMES, supra note 75, at 155. 
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proposals for interpreting or completing the distributive rules of a global 
socialist constitution. The logical consequence is that global justice is an
enterprise in global associational reform.  What advocates of global justice 
propose is to replace the existing international legal order for a sort of 
global common venture  association that honors common ownership of world 
wealth and capital. This proposal merits consideration.
Global associative self-transformation could proceed by explicit 
institutional reform or by interpretation of existing legal norms.  Because 
there is a near-zero probability that rich countries such as Russia, the U.S., 
and China will agree on a massive institutional reform that recognizes 
global ownership over their resources, wealth, and income, the exegetical
route seems more promising, at least in the sense that its failure is not so 
visible as to deter interesting deliberation on the proposal.  Therefore, the 
question is whether exegetical self-transformation is worth considering. 
As I said, international associations lack de facto and de jure capacity to 
put in practice a process of interpretive self-transformation.  Though there 
is no “living international law” movement that advocates for the same 
plastic leeway defended with respect to national constitutions, global justice 
theorists are already embarked on the task of portraying ideal global societies.
This is a prestigious philosophical tradition, and it is not my intention to 
challenge the value of these intellectual pursuits. My point is that that
task does not serve global constitutional interpretation. 
Given that the task of portraying a world that is organized around the 
idea of global justice is an exercise in idealized institutional design, my
question is whether that design is utopian or rather dystopian.  I think that 
global justice theorizing is dystopian, despite its noble aims.  To be operative 
a global redistributive association should possess the powers usually
conferred on a national distributive association. For example, it is 
inconceivable to establish a global redistributive association without broad 
taxation, spending and redistributive powers.  This vast concentration of 
powers on a global level would resemble very much a world government. 
For instance, it should have a decision-making procedure for reaching 
directives that apply to all countries, including those countries that disagree
with the majority.  This already implies relinquishing a degree of national 
sovereignty.  It should have some settlement and enforcement mechanism.
Is a global redistributive association worth pursuing?  Rawls says to 
justify his rejection of a world government: 
[a] world government—by which I mean a unified political regime with the legal
powers normally exercised by central governments—would either be a global 
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despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as
various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy.109
My own prediction is a bit different.  I bet that a world government 
would eventually become a regime of patronage, populism, and political
clientelism.  This kind of global political regime would tend to keep
poverty in the poorest regions of the world as a form of maintaining global 
power. Because these features are already present in most of the
redistributive associations in the world, why should we expect the global 
redistributive association to perform better?  Given the looser representative
character of global politicians, and the weaker accounting schemes that 
global redistribution allows, globalization would just exacerbate the various
pathologies that affect the average political association in the world. 
However, my argument against a global distributive association does 
not rely on such factual claims as those wielded by Rawls against a world 
government. My argument draws on a normative assumption and a defining 
feature of a global distributive regime.  National political associations 
have a fundamental feature that a global association would not have, and 
that feature contributes to their possible justification.  It is relevant to frame
the feature in terms of international legal norms, but the point is more 
ethical than legal.  Article 12 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights declares, “[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.”110  This provision relies on the freedom of any individual
to exit any association, political or otherwise.  Free States guarantee that
no one should be compelled to belong to an association against his or
her will, be it a national association or any other kind of association.  
Whereas free States guarantee this human right and dictatorial States
disregard it, it is in principle possible for all national States to respect
this right. In contrast, a world government could guarantee only a hollow 
right to leave the global political association.  Even in a world of “unions” 
and “federations”, the French and the Polish can leave the European Union 
and settle in Paraguay or Singapore.  But in a world of one single political
association, free exit would be inconceivable.  Because free exit makes
it possible for membership to be voluntary, rather than compulsory, there 
is a morally significant sense in which membership in a world government 
would be compulsory.
History teaches that freedom of movement across national sovereign 
jurisdictions is a sure bulwark against political persecution.  Is the promise 
of improving the global distribution of resources a sufficient justification 
109. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON 
REVISITED” 36 (1999). 
110. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12, supra note 89, 999 
U.N.T.S. at 179. 
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for the sure loss of a fundamental human right?  If government by consent 
becomes an empty ideal because divergence with the basic global structure
cannot express itself in exile, asylum, or emigration, the program for a 
global distributive association becomes dystopian.  A world in which
individuals have the real freedom to choose their political membership 
within a broad set of different kinds of associations seems perfect for a 
nice sleep. A world run by a global bureaucratic apparatus that recognizes 
no moral rights on income and wealth rather evokes a nightmare.  And 
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